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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL SHURTLEFF, MAX S.
ANDREWS, NED SHURTLEFF,
HARVEY R. CARSON and GARRY
R. COLE, General Partners,
dba AMERICAN SALES COMPANY
(ASCO), a Utah Limited
Partnership,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents

Case No. 164 70

vs.
JAY TUFT & COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant and
Appellant
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
JAY TUFT & COMPANY, a Utah corporation, (hereinafter
termed the "Defendant"), in its appeal to this Court,
seeks to reverse the judgment on a jury verdict which
awarded AMERICAN SALES C0!1PANY (ASCO), a Utah Limited
Partnership, (hereinafter termed the "Plaintiffs"), the
sum of $15,651.73 representing parts, labor and repairs
to a backhoe leased by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant.
The Defendant also seeks a new trial on its Counterclaim,
which the jury rejected, and a new trial dealing with
delinquent rentals, which the jury awarded to the Plaintiffs.
The Defendant bases its challenge to the jury verdict
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
upon sixSponsored
separate
grounds.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the Judgment on
Verdict of Jury, the Order of the trial court denying
the Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment or in the
Alternative for a New Trial and, in addition, seek an
award of Plaintiffs' costs on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While certain of the facts stated by the Defendant
are correct and undisputed, others are argumentative and
represent the Defendant's version of the evidence.

The

essential facts are that the Defendant leased from the
Plaintiffs, pursuant to a written agreement, a used
American Hydraulic Backhoe, Model 35, for the period
March 21, 1977 to January 20, 1978.

The agreement,

[Ex.

P-1], provided in pertinent part that the lease term
would be for a minimum of thirty (30) days and such
additional days as the Defendant required the backhoe.
The lease rate negotiated by the parties was $4,800.00
per month plus applicable taxes of $240.00 per month, a
total of $5,040.00 per month.

The agreement could be

terminated by either party upon five (5) days written
notice and contained an option in favor of the Defendant
to purchase the backhoe.

The option to purchase was not

exercised by the Defendant at any time.
The Defendant had previously leased this same
backhoe from the Plaintiffs under two separate lease
agreements.

(Tr. 110).

The Defendant was fully acquainted
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with the capabilities of the machine.

Prior to the

commencement of the subject lease, the backhoe was
serviced by the Plaintiffs and checked by the Defendant.
[Ex. P-4].

During the lease term the backhoe required

maintenance, servicing, repairs and parts.

At no time

did the Defendant terminate the lease agreement.
The Defendant refused to pay the rental payments
from October, 1977 through January, 1978 totalling
$20,167.75 and charges for parts, labor and repairs in
the sum of $15,651.73.

[Ex. P-22].

Following repossession

of the backhoe, the above-entitled action was commenced
in the District Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY VERDICT AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFFS
$15,651.73 FOR REPAIRS TO THE BACKHOE IS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Defendant argues in Point I of its Brief that the
verdict for repairs was not supported by the evidence for
the following reasons:
1.

The Defendant is not liable for repairs

under the lease agreement because:

(a)

the lease is

silent as to who has the responsibility to pay for
the repairs (Appellant's Brief at 23); (b)

therefore,

the custom and usage of the industry with respect to
repairs controls,

(Appellant's Brief at 27); (c)

all

witnesses who testified as to custom and usage said
that the custom in the industry is that the lessor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(Plaintiffs) pays for all repairs except those repairs
caused by operator abuse or the lessee's negligence
and except for the replacement of filters and bucket
teeth, (Appellant's Brief at 26-30); and (d)

there

was no evidence of operator abuse (Appellant's Brief
Point !(2) at 20).
2.

Defendant should not be held liable for the

repairs because the mechanics that performed the repairs
were incompetent.
3.

(Appellant's Brief Point I(l)).

Plaintiffs are not the real party in interest.

(Appellant's Brief Point !(6)).
4.

The Plaintiffs will be unjustly enriched if

they recover for repairs.

(Appellant's Brief Point

I (7)).

A careful review of the Defendant's Brief and its
shot-gun approach to the issues already tried in this
case, suggests nothing more than a re-hash of the same
arguments made to the jury at trial and argued to the
court in Defendant's post-trial motions.

Both the jury

and the court rejected all such arguments.
Without completely reviewing nearly one thousand
(1,000) pages of testimony in this case, it is sufficient
to say that the jury heard and considered the evidence
presented, as did the court, and in considering and
weighing such evidence, determined to reJect the claim of
the Defendant and awarded damages to the Plaintiffs.

That

such verdict will not be overturned and will be affirmed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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unless there is substantial and prejudicial error (which
cannot be supported by the record in this case) has long
been the law in the State of Utah as enunciated by this
Court.

In Gilhespie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah,

1974), Mr. Justice Crockett wrote:
That the parties appear to have had
what they are entitled to: a full and fair
opportunity to present their contentions,
and the evidence supporting them, to the
court and jury, and to have a verdict and
judgment entered thereon. When this has
been done, all presumptions are in favor of
the validity of the verdict and judgment;
and this court will not disturb them unless
there is substantial and prejudicial error,
absent which there is a reasonable likelihood
that there would have been a different
result.
See also, Thomas v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
548 P.2d 621 (Utah 1976).
So it is in the case sub judice.

For a period of

nine (9) days the parties offered evidence to support
their respective positions.

The documentary evidence

submitted by the Defendant numbered in the hundreds of
pages.

No argument can be made that the Defendant was

not given a full and fair opportunity to present its
contentions.

While some of the evidence was conflicting,

the jury sorted that evidence and rendered a verdict.
The trial court, after due consideration of the posttrial motions of the Defendant, likewise rejected the
Defendant's contentions.
The Defendant commences its argument with the
assertion that the seven (7) women on the jury did not
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understand the technical aspects of the backhoe as related
to the

~epairs

in this case.

(Appellant's Brief at 9).

It

is noted that in the exercise of the Defendant's peremptory
challenges to the jury, the Defendant elected to strike
three (3) males from the panel.

[R. 249].

At no time

prior to the filing of the Appellant's Brief has the Defendant
raised the issue of the makeup of the jury panel.

The Defendant

should not now be permitted to assert such a challenge, and
the same should be stricken by this Court.
A. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT
DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE UNDER THE LEASE TO PAY
FOR ALL REPAIRS IRRESPECTIVE OF THE CAUSE.
1. The Lease Expressly Provides That The
Lessee, Defendant, Shall Pay for Repairs.
The arguments advanced by the Defendant, both at
trial and before this Court, are predicated upon an
interpretation of the equipment lease agreement [Ex. P-1]
executed by the parties.

Contrary to Defendant's assertion,

the agreement is not silent on the question of repairs.
The agreement provides that the " • • • Lessee shall keep
the equipment in good repair and condition
added).

II

(Emphasis

The plain reading of that portion of the lease

places the responsibility and duty of keeping the equipment
in good repair and condition squarely on the lessee.
It is undisputed and a matter of common knowledge
that in every equipment lease transaction such equipment
will, through normal use, depreciate and experience some
wear and tear.

The Defendant argues, however, that all

repairs performed on the backhoe were the result of "reasonable
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wear and tear" and are the responsibility of the lessor,
excepting only those repairs required by reason of the
lessee's negligence in the operation of the backhoe.
(Appellant's Brief at 26-30).

Such an interpretation

renders the duty placed upon the lessee to "keep the
equipment in good repair and condition" meaningless and
without any force or effect whatever.
The lease further provides that the lessee " • • •
will return the equipment in as good condition as when
leased, including final servicing, reasonable wear and
tear excepted."

[Ex. P-1).

It of course goes without

saying that when a piece of construction equipment is
returned following its use on a construction project, the
tracks have been worn, the paint has deteriorated, the
integral parts of the machine have experienced some wear
and the machine is not in "mint" condition.

That is not

to say that the backhoe in this case could have been
returned by the Defendant under the express terms of the
agreement with a broken axle, with a malfunctioning and
inoperable charging system and a hydraulic system which
was totally contaminated.

Such, however, is the position

the Defendant now in effect urges.

The Plaintiffs submit

that the language in the lease agreement excepting reasonable
wear and tear applies to the condition of the equipment
when it is returned and does not modify, change or render
a nullity the language which requires the lessee to keep
the equipment in good repair and condition.

-7-
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2.

The Evidence Establishes That Both
Parties Interpreted The Lease as
:Reguiring the Lessee to Pay for Repairs.
Defendant's argument that the maintenance and servicing
of the machine was the responsibility of the Plaintiffs is
unreasonable and has no basis in the evidence.

It is

undisputed that the backhoe once leased is in the exclusive
control of the Defendant.

Somehow the Defendant seeks to

impose upon the Plaintiffs a duty to service the equipment,
maintain it and repair it, even though such equipment was
operated by Defendant on its construction projects miles
from the Plaintiffs' business.
The lease agreement is captioned nBare Rental w/Option
to Purchase".

The lease agreement specifies the lessee's

duty to keep the equipment in good repair and condition.
Mr. Carson, one of the Plaintiffs' partners, testified
that during the lease period the Plaintiffs did not rent
equipment on a basis where the Plaintiff paid for repairs
and servicing.

{Tr. 24).

Contrary to Defendant's contention,

the lease rate did not include a reserve for repairs.
{Tr. 24).

Mr. Carson further testified that had the lease

rate included servicing and maintenance, the lease rate
would have been significantly higher.

{Tr. 83)

In fact,

the negotiated lease rate was lower than the suggested
industry rate on the subject backhoe by $2,000.00 per
month.

{Tr. 82).

Mr. Baldwin also testified that

maintenan~

and servicing was the responsibility of the Defendant (Tr.
323 and 342).
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More importantly, the Defendant recognized its responsibilit~.

Mr. Williams, one of the Defendant's mechanics,

testified that he spent some 13 hours on the maintenance,
servicing and repair of the machine on the Decker Lake
project alone.

Mr. Broadhead, the Defendant's maintenance

man, testified that he was employed by the Defendant for
the purpose of maintaining the machine and completed check
lists of forms indicating the services that were performed
on a regular basis.

[Ex. D-41); (Tr. 609).

Mr. Bowers,

an employee of the Defendant, completed repairs on the
backhoe as well.

(Tr. 613).

The Defendant paid the

Plaintiff for repairs on the backhoe in the sum of $315.97.
(Tr. 193); [Ex. P-20).
The Defendant argues that the policy of Plaintiffs,
as indicated by their conduct, was to pay for repairs.

In

fact, the testimony of Plaintiffs' witnesses, Mr. Hulse
and Mr. Carson, was to the effect that although the responsibility for repairs rests exclusively with the lessee,
when the Defendant indicated a real interest in purchasing
the machine, the Plaintiffs, for the purpose of maintaining
a good rapport with the Defendant, were more lenient in
charging for repairs.

(Tr. 59, 172-73).

Contrary to the

argument of Defendant, Mr. Hulse did E.Q! testify that
Plaintiffs would pay for all of the repairs occasioned by
Defendant's use of the machine.

(Tr. 175).

Mr. Hulse

only testified that if the lessee had a problem, Plaintiffs
would send a mechanic out to fix it, but that the lease
required the Defendant to pay for parts and service.
175).

(Tr.
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Nor did Mr. Hulse testify that such maJor items as a
broken axle or an alternator would be paid by Plaintiffs.
Mr. Hulse only observed that if an axle were found to be
defective, it would be repaired by Asco.

(Tr. 145-47).

There was no such evidence in this case.

Mr. Hulse further

testified that while a malfunctioning alternator would be
considered a major problem, he did not specifically indicate
that such an item would, as a matter of policy under the
lease, be repaired at Plaintiffs' expense.

(Tr. 147).

Mr. Hulse did testify that under the circumstances of
this case, the decision as to who would bear the cost for
an item of repair depended, to some extent, upon whether
the problem was caused by operator abuse or improper
maintenance.

(Tr. 145-46, 177).

The evidence, taken as a

whole, overwhelmingly supports the argument that the major
problems with the backhoe were caused directly by the poor
and improper maintenance given to the machine by Defendant.
(See Point IB, infra.).

With or without a policy on

repairs, maintenance was the responsibility of Defendant
and the damages caused from the failure to maintain are
also the responsibility of Defendant.
3.

Express Terms Control Custom and Usage.

The Defendant argues at length that somehow industry
custom and usage changes and modifies the express duty of
the lessee so that the responsibility of repairing the
backhoe is placed on the lessor.

This argument ignores

the fact that under Utah law, express terms of a contract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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control over testimony regarding custom and usage.
70A-l-2~5,

Section

Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides in relevant

part:
The express terms of an agreement and
an applicable course of dealing or usage of
trade shall be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but when such
construction is unreasonable express terms
control both course of dealing and usage of
trade and course of dealing controls usage
of trade.
[E~phasis added]
In construing this Section of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the courts have uniformly held that Section 70A-l-205
only permits trade usages and dealings between the parties
to supplement or give meaning to particular terms of a
contract when it is reasonable and there is no inconsistency
between the express terms of the contract and the interpretation based upon custom or usage.

Where there is any

inconsistency between custom and usage and the express
contract terms, the contract must control.

See,

~,

Colorado Bank & Trust Co. v. Western Slope Invest., Inc.,
539 P.2d 501, 503 (Colo. App. 1975); Corenswet, Inc. v.
Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 549 F.2d 129, 136 (5th Cir.
1979); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d
283 (7th Cir., 1974).
In the instant case, the express terms of the contract
clearly placed the duty to repair upon the lessee and the
contract terms are, therefore, controlling over any testimony
of custom and usage by the Defendant's putative experts.
It is also well settled that the Defendant bears the
burden of proving the custom and usage in an industry by
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clear evidence which must not be uncertain or contradicted.
Martin v. Whiteley, 405 P.2d 963 (Idaho 1965).

See also,

Radio Station KFH Co. v. Musicians Ass'n., 169 Kan. 596, 220
P.2d 199, 205 (1953).

It is also well established that the

custom or general practice in an industry must be established
by the opinion of a properly qualified expert who knows and
testifies to the general practices in his field.

Trimball

v. Coleman Co., 200 Kan. 350, 437 P.2d 219 (1968).

In

Trimball, the court rejected testimony by witnesses as to
their individual practices which was offered to establish
the general practice in the field.

As a general proposi-

tion, the courts have been unwilling to accept the testimony
of what one individual or one company did as constituting
sufficient evidence of a custom or trade usage.

See for

example, Coury Bros. Ranches, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 103 Ariz.
515, 446 P.2d 458, 464 (1968).

Over the objection, (Tr.

662, 666) and continuing objection, (Tr. 680) of the Plantiffs,
a Mr. Babcock, called as the Defendant's expert, was permitted
to testify concerning his understanding of such industry
custom and usage as to duty to repair, as was the Defendant's
principal officer, Mr. Tuft.

(Tr. 801-802).

The flaw in

the position of the Defendant was and is that neither
Mr. Babcock nor Mr. Tuft were lessors or dealers of construction equipment, but, in fact, were users and customers
of dealers.

No foundation was ever laid with respect to

their knowledge of industry standards other than as lessees.
(Tr. 652, 654-655, 796-798, 801-802).

No lessor or witness
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from the equipment leasing industry was called or testified
as to any industry standard, custom or usage with respect to
the assumption of the duty to repair leased equipment by the
lessor thereof.

Even Mr. Babcock admitted that the handling

of problems and repairs can be matters of negotiation between
lessors and lessees.

(Tr. 731).

In the instant case, the Defendant attempted to contradict the clear and unequivocal language in the lease regarding
the duty to repair by introducing opinion testimony by
unqualified witnesses as to their individual understanding
of the custom in the industry.

It is questionable in the

first instance whether such evidence was even properly
admissible.

Such testimony is also in direct conflict with

the testimony of Mr. Wienke that the items of repair under
dispute were not items of ordinary wear and tear.
146).

(Tr. 415-

It cannot be disputed, however, that the jury which

heard and considered Defendant's evidence rejected it.
B. THE DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR THE REPAIRS PERFORMED
EVEN UNDER DEFENDANT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LEASE.
Defendant argues that the lessor is responsible for
repairs unless the problem was caused by operator abuse or
negligence of the lessee.

(Appellant's Brief at 26-30).

All three of the major problems with the backhoe were
caused by operator abuse or negligence of the Defendant.
1.

Hydraulic System Problems.

When Mr. Baldwin was dispatched to the Alpine job
site, he personally observed the "red" condition in the
sight glass.

(Tr. 317).

He pulled the 25 micron filter
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and described what he observed firsthand.

(Tr. 317).

The

filter was "completely packed on both sides and layers at
least an inch to two inches thick on the bottom of metal
filings."

(Tr. 317).

in color.

Mr. Baldwin showed the filter to Mr. Tuft and

Mr. Bowers.

The filings were brass and silver

(Tr. 318).

Even the Defendant's witnesses

admitted that by the time metal filings are found in the
filter, the damage to the machine necessitating complete
decontamination of the hydraulic system had already occurred.
(Tr. 703); (See also, Mr. Wienke's testimony Tr. 451).
In an effort to explain the design of the backhoe and
particularly the hydraulic system, the Plaintiffs called
as an expert witness Mr. Charles Wienke.

Mr. Wienke was

the chief engineer for American Hoist and Derrick Co., the
manufacturer of the backhoe, and was responsible for the
actual design of the American Model 35 Backhoe, which is
the subject of this case.

(Tr. 390).

Mr. Wienke explained

in detail the design of the hydraulic system, its component
parts and particularly the warm-up procedures that must be
followed by the operator of the backhoe.

(Tr. 392-394).

According to Mr. Wienke, the contamination of the
hydraulic system could occur as a result of five possible
causes.

The first is in the manufacture of the backhoe

itself.

In that process some very fine metallic particles

can find their way into the machine's system.

(Tr. 406).

These particles are filtered out of the machine after the
first 100 hours of operation.

(Tr. 406).

The subject
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backhoe had approximately 2,000 hours of time in operation
and the-contamination from that source in this case can be
ruled out.

Also, those particles are so small they cannot

be seen in the filter (Tr. 407) and certainly those particles
are not of the type described by Mr. Baldwin.

(Tr. 317).

The second possible cause of contamination was damage
to the boom and cylinder in the operation of the backhoe.
such admittedly occurred on the Wellington job when the
Defendant scraped the side of a trench box and fractured
one of the hydraulic lines.

(Tr. 486).

Mr. Healey testified

that such was the Defendant's "fault" and that the line
was replaced by the Defendant.

(Tr. 486).

By reason of

the passage of time from June of 1978 until the contamination
of the backhoe at Alpine in the Fall of 1978, the contamination as the result of that occurrence seems at best remote.
It is noted, however, that even under the Defendant's
position, the Defendant would be liable for repairs to the
backhoe necessitated by the Defendant's admitted negligence
in the operation of the backhoe.
The third possible cause of the contamination could
be the failure of the Defendant to properly oil the backhoe.
(Tr. 399).

Even Mr. Babcock, the Defendant's expert,

placed that responsibility on the Defendant.

(Tr. 731).

With respect to the oil, Mr. Wienke testified at length
concerning its specifications and that the manufacturer
specified the use of a mineral-based oil with a certain
viscosity (Tr. 401) and testified that a non-mineral based
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oil sometimes results in an improper mixture.

(Tr. 402).

In all events, the oil added to the machine must be filtered
through a 10 micron filter to remove impurities and contamination from its container (Tr. 400).

The Defendant was

unable to present any evidence as to the type of oil added
to the machine, but admitted without qualification that
the required 10 micron filter was not used.

(Tr. 530).

If the contamination came from that source, it is clear
that such was the fault of the Defendant, which had the
responsibility to add proper oil to the backhoe.

The

contaminated oil cause can be eliminated if the filters
are not clogged and are working properly.

(Tr. 436).

According to Mr. Baldwin, the same were clogged and were
not working properly.

(Tr. 319).

The fourth possible cause was the failure of the
Defendant to follow proper warm-up procedures.

Mr. Wienke

testified that if the appropriate warm-up procedures are
not followed a "cavitation condition" is caused, which in
essence creates a vacuum in certain pumps in the machine,
the result of which is that metal particles are pulled out
of the pumps themselves and into the machine's hydraulic
oil and system.

(Tr. 394).

The machine is designed to

remove impurities from the hydraulic oil through a filteration
process.

It is clear, however, that the damage to the

machine has been done before the oil with metal particles
reaches the filter via the storage tank where proper warmup procedures are not followed.

(Tr. 703).

Mr. Wienke
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summarized his conclusion as follows:

"When you see the

metal filings, you have already failed the pump."

(Tr.

451).
It should be noted that Mr. Baldwin discussed with
Mr. Bowers, a supervisory employee of the Defendant, the
warm-up procedures to be followed (Tr. 285) and at all
times the Defendant had the operating manual for the
machine [Ex. D-36), although the Defendant's operator
admitted he had never read it.

(Tr. 553).

The final possible cause was the failure to change
filters in the machine as required and needed.

It is

undisputed that the filters on the machine should have
been changed under normal working conditions of between
300 and 500 machine operating hours or more often if
conditions required.

(Tr. 414).

Perhaps the best and

most accurate statement of the cause of the hydraulic
system contamination on this machine was stated by Mr.
Wienke.

Mr. Wienke testified that " • • • if the filters

would have been changed on time and kept clean, you wouldn't
have got those metal filings in the filter."

(Tr. 415).

Mr. Wienke further testified that contamination or permitting
the condition of contamination to occur is not "normal
wear and tear on the machine."

(Tr. 415).

Defendant's own witness admitted that the changing of
filters was the responsibility of the Defendant.
563, 610 and 663)

(Tr.

The evidence at the trial was overwhelming

that the required 25 micron filter as designed and used in
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the backhoe could be purchased only from an authorized
dealer.·

(Tr. 396).

It is undisputed that Shurtleff and

Andrews and the Plaintiffs are the sole dealers in the
State of Utah.

(Tr. 396).

Mr. Lester reviewed twice

during the course of the trial the files and records of
Shurtleff & Andrews and American Sales Company and was
unable to verify the purchase of any filter by the Defendant.
(Tr. 958).

The Defendant was unable to verify the purchase

of a filter from any source during the course of the lease
term.

While it is clear that under optimum conditions the

25 micron filter should have been changed at least three
times during the term of the lease, in fact, the record is
devoid of any evidence of a filter change by the Defendant
after the backhoe left the Decker Lake job.
578).

(Tr. 563 and

Under the state of the evidence, the jury could not

only reasonably infer but had no alternative other than to
conclude that the filters in the machine were not changed
timely.

2.

Axle Problems.

After the backhoe was delivered to the Murray job, an
axle on the machine was broken.

The axle was replaced by

the Plaintiff without charge to the Defendant.

A second

axle was broken on the Wellington job and it cannot be
determined whether that axle was the new axle or not.
(Tr. 377).

It is clear, however, that the breaking of

parts, including an axle, is not normal wear and tear.
(Tr. 415).
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The testimony at the trial was that there are two
causes of axle breakage.

(Tr. 348-349, 356).

is undue stress being placed on an axle.

The first

Mr. Baldwin, who

replaced the axle, testified that he observed a twisting
effect in the sheared axle on the Wellington job (Tr.
363).

The evidence is clear and unrebutted that the

Defendant operated the backhoe on both the Murray and
Wellington jobs while one axle was broken.

Incredible as

it seems, the Defendant operated this 42-ton machine using
only one track and "limping" the machine along rather than
shutting it down for repairs.

This practice was rejected

by the designer of the machine, Mr. Wienke (Tr. 402), by
Mr. Baldwin (Tr. 289, 298, 299), and even by Mr. Williams,
the Defendant's own mechanic.

(Tr. 591).

The testimony

was further uncontradicted that such constituted improper
maintenance.

(Tr. 348).

There was ample evidence for the

jury to find that such constituted negligence on the part
of the Defendant or operator abuse.
The second cause of axle failure can result from
debris, rocks and mud caught in the tumbler and sprocket
portion of the machine's track assembly.

(Tr. 297, 417).

Mr. Baldwin testified concerning the heavy, muddy conditions
in which the machine was being operated on the Wellington
job.

He testified that he and Mr. Woods had to clean the

machine with prybar-type instruments.

(Tr. 297).

Mr.

Baldwin further testified that it was the operation of the
backhoe in conditions such as he observed on the Wellington
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job without removing the rocks and debris that constituted
improper operation and abuse.

(Tr. 298).

Mr. Wienke

verified that operating the backhoe under such conditions
could cause an axle to break even on a new machine.

(Tr.

417).
There was more than sufficient evidence for the jury
to conclude that the cause of the axle breakage was improper
operation and abuse.
3.

Charging System Problems.

In Point I the Defendant argues at length that it was
improperly charged for repairs to the charging system of
the backhoe on the Wellington project.

For a period of

five (5) days, the Defendant started this machine by
"jumping" the spark from a 12-volt pickup truck to a 24volt backhoe.

(Tr. 510).

The evidence was uncontradicted

that such a practice is highly improper.

Mr. Wienke

testified that you simply don't do it that way.
432).

(Tr. 416,

In fact, his testimony was that the pickup batteries

would not charge the backhoe batteries.

(Tr. 434).

To

trained construction people such as those in the Defendant's
employ, it should have been patently obvious after five
(5) days that their "makeshift" starting system was not
working.

Mr. Baldwin testified that if such a procedure

were employed improperly in terms of the hook-up, the
charging system could be seriously damaged.

(Tr. 384).

The problem was serious enough that separate mechanics
were called in to remedy and repair the problem.
8].

[Ex. D-

There was not only sufficient, but virtually uncontradictec
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testimony from which the jury could find and did find that
those charges were properly assessed against the Defendant.
C.

THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE MECHANICS
WERE COMPETENT AND FOLLOWI:D PROPER
PROCEDURES IN REPAIRING THE BACKHOE.

The Defendant argues in Point I

(1) of its Brief that

the mechanics who repaired the backhoe were incompetent
because (1) Ray Baldwin should have checked the main
hydraulic filter earlier, and (2) Ray Baldwin did not
follow proper procedures in decontaminating the hydraulic
system.

Such assertions have no basis and cannot be

supported by the evidence in this case.
The attack of the Defendant is directed primarily to
the competency of Mr. Baldwin, one of the mechanics who
worked on the backhoe.

Mr. Baldwin had been employed as

a mechanic for a period of approximately eighteen (18)
years.

His experience included work on all types of heavy

equipment in Utah and elsewhere.

(Tr. 280-281, 379-380).

Most importantly, Mr. Baldwin was the mechanic who actually
worked on the subject backhoe, observed its condition
first hand and made repairs thereto.
It is noted at the outset that the Defendant was not
reguired to use mechanics suggested by the Plaintiffs.
The Defendant was free to use any mechanic to "keep the
equipment in good repair and condition."
P-1).

(Tr. 90); [Ex.

It is undisputed that during the course of the

lease term, the Defendant utilized the services of its own
mechanics and service personnel.

Interestingly enough, the
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record is devoid of any objection or complaint filed or made
by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs with respect to Mr.

Baldwi~

mechanical competence or lack thereof prior to the institution
of suit in this case.
Mr. Baldwin did not have the duty to check the main
hydraulic filter visual indicator and to make other inspections of the backhoe.

Those duties were assumed by the

Defendant and each of its witnesses so testified.

(Tr.

563, 610, 663, 528-31, 551; Respondent's Brief at 20,
supra).

The job of the mechanic is to locate the specific

problem and get the machine back in operating condition as
fast as possible.

(Tr. 321, 450).

In any case, once the

filings are in the filter, the damage is already done.
(Tr. 451, 703).
The Defendant's second complaint is that Mr. Baldwin
did not follow proper procedures in the repair and decontamination
of the backhoe's hydraulic system.

Mr. Wienke listened to

the testimony of Mr. Baldwin with respect to the procedures
followed by Mr. Baldwin and concluded that the procedure
followed by Mr. Baldwin was acceptable.

(Tr. 420).

D. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
JOIN A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WAS PROPERLY DENIED.
At the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief, the Defendant,
for the first time, moved for a dismissal of Plaintiffs'
claim for cost of repairs on the basis that the claim had not
been prosecuted by the real party in interest pursuant to
Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendant claims

that since the repairs were performed by mechanics from
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Shurtleff and Andrews, the action for recovery of such
repair costs should properly come from Shurtleff and Andrews.
After considering the Defendant's oral motion made in open
court, the trial court ruled that there was sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find that a contract for
the payment of the repairs existed between Plaintiffs and
Defendant.

Accordingly, the motion was denied.

(Tr. 479).

The only conceivable basis of Defendant's Motion arises
from the procedure by which repairs were ordered and made by
the parties.

The testimony at trial established that whenever

Defendant required repairs it notified the Plaintiffs,
specifying the nature of the problem.

Since Plaintiffs

employed no mechanics of its own, it would request the services
of mechanics employed by Shurtleff and Andrews.

(Tr. 25).

Accordingly, an order for repairs would be sent from Plaintiffs
to Shurtleff and Andrews and the latter would dispatch its
mechanics at Plaintiffs' direction.

(Tr. 25).

A statement

would be calculated and a bill sent from Shurtleff and Andrews
to Plaintiffs for the services rendered.

(Tr. 25, 35-36).

Plaintiffs would then, in turn, bill Defendant for the
repairs.

[Exs. D-8 and D-9).

At no time did Shurtleff and Andrews send statements to
or demand payment from the Defendant for the repairs.
every case Shurtleff and Andrews billed Plaintiffs.
e.g., Ex. D-8).

In
(See,

Shurtleff and Andrews recognized that

Plaintiffs had requested the mechanics and, therefore,
Plaintiffs, not Defendant, was responsible for the charges.
(Tr. 25).
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If the requested repairs required specialized training,
Plaintiffs retained the services of other repairmen, such as
Abbott GM Diesel, Inc.
(Tr. 68-69);

[Ex. D-8].

Abbott also billed Plaintiffs directly,
This procedure was followed through-

out the lease term and the Defendant paid certain of Plaintifh'
statements without objection or comment.

(Tr. 193) [Ex. P-

20].
1.

Timeliness of Motion.

The timing of Defendant's Motion is, at best, highly
questionable.

The Defendant knew from the outset that Plaintiffs

employed the services of Shurtleff and Andrews to make the
necessary repairs.

No claim can or has been made that these

facts were a surprise to the Defendant.

However, contrary to

the allegations of the Defendant, this issue was not raised,
expressly or by implication, by the Defendant either in its
Answer or any subsequent pleading.
It has long been the established rule of law that the
failure of a party to timely raise an objection based upon
Rule 17 in its Answer, or at the outset of the pleadings,
acts as a waiver of the objection.

This Court has affirmed

the rule of law as above summarized on two prior occasions.
In Fritz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 25 Utah 263, 71 P.
209 (1903), the Defendant raised an objection as to the real
party in interest at trial.

This Court, in its ruling,

stated:
[T]his objection was urged too late, and must
be held to have been waived.
"The objection
that the plaintiff in an action is not the
real party in interest • • • when available
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by way of defense, must be raised by demurrer
or answer, or it will be considered to have
been waived." Id. at 214 (Emphasis added)
In the subsequent case of Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Fite
Candy Co., 57 Utah 1, 168 P. 427 (1917), this Court, dealing
with a defense of lack of standing, related the same to a
motion for failure to prosecute in the name of a real party
in interest, holding:
Such an objection is like one that the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest.
That objection must be made by special
demurrer if it appears on the face of the
complaint, and, if it does not so appear,
then advantage of it must be taken by answer,
and if not taken either by answer or demurrer
the objection is waived.
Id. at 428.
(Emphasis added).
See also, Parker v. Brown, 4 Cal. 2d 344, 254 P.2d 6 (1953).
The timing of Defendant's Motion indicates that it is
nothing more than a thinly-disguised attempt by Defendant
to bootstrap itself into an argument for dismissal.

Defendant

has known from the very outset of this litigation that
Plaintiffs, when requested by Defendant to repair the
backhoe, would employ the services of mechanics from Shurtleff
and Andrews and others.

Defendant was fully aware that no

monthly billings were sent by Shurtleff and Andrews to
Defendant but that all statements were sent to Plaintiffs.
[See Exs. D-8 and D-9].
That the Defendant never considered the possibility
that it owed Shurtleff and Andrews for the repairs, rather
than Plaintiffs, is also apparent.

At no time did Defendant

express any concern about the identity of the company
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entitled to be paid for the repairs.

Mr. Tuft, the principal

officer-of the Defendant, testified that he had a number of
conversations with Plaintiffs regarding both the rental
payments and the repair payments on the backhoe, but not
once did Mr. Tuft raise a question as to whom payment
should be made.

(Tr. 845).

Not even when the Defendant was served with a Summons
and Complaint seeking recovery of the repair costs did the
Defendant raise an issue as to whether the wrong entity was
demanding payment.

Defendant's Amended Answer and Counter-

claim (R. 151) filed barely one month prior to trial,
contains nothing more than the customary boilerplate Motion
to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Defendant's

Answers to Interrogatories add little other than an allegation that Shurtleff and Andrews might also be liable to the
Defendant since Shurtleff and Andrews provided the labor
and parts.

(R. 159).

If Defendant seriously believed

Shurtleff and Andrews was responsible under the Counterclaim,
one wonders why Shurtleff and Andrews was never brought into
this action by the Defendant.
It is further noteworthy that Defendant in its Motion
was concerned only with Shurtleff and Andrews and not with
other repairmen such as Abbott GM Diesel, Inc.

Defendant

knew that Plaintiffs had hired Abbott to repair the charging
system, just as Plaintiffs had hired Shurtleff and Andrews
to accomplish other repairs.
The simple fact remains that Defendant did not timely
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raise its objection under Rule 17.

Under the clear facts

established at trial, the Motion of Defendant was improper;
is deemed waived and was properly denied by the trial
court.
2.

Real Party in Interest.

The trial court correctly ruled that since there was
sufficient evidence to find that a contract to pay for the
repairs existed between the parties, Defendant's Motion
should be denied.
A real party in interest is defined by the case law as
any party who actually owns the cause of action and is in a
position to release the claim once satisfied.

In Anheuser-

Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 170 P.2d 448, the
California Supreme Court noted:
Where plaintiff shows such title that a
judgment satisfied by the defendant will
protect defendant from future annoyance or
loss, and defendant can urge any defenses he
could make against the real owner, the action
is being prosecuted in the name of the •real
party in interest." Id. at 449.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in State v. Barker, 51
N.M. 51, 178 P.2d 401, held that the existence of a real
party in interest depends on:
• • • (1) whether he is the owner of the
right to be enforced; or (2) whether he is in
a position to release and discharge defendant
from liability on which action is grounded.
Id. at 402.
It has further been noted that the ownership of the claim
must be substantive and not simply technical or nominal.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. King, 381 P.2d 153 (Okl. 1963).
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The purpose of the rule is to allow a party to assert
all available defenses against the real owner of the cause
of action, thereby being allowed a full hearing on the
merits of the controversy.

Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 155,

239 P.2d 745 (1952).
In the case at bar the evidence clearly indicates that
Plaintiffs are a real party in interest to this litigation.
Plaintiffs were the party with whom Defendant contracted
for the lease of the backhoe.

(Tr. 834-35);

[Ex. P-1).

It

was the Plaintiffs that Defendant would call if the machine
needed repairs.

(Tr. 24).

It was Plaintiffs that requested

mechanics from Shurtleff and Andrews and others.

The

mechanics were dispatched under the direction of Plaintiffs
and the services rendered were billed by Shurtleff and
Andrews, not to Defendant, but to Plaintiffs.

(Tr. 25-26).

Plaintiffs would then see that the bill was paid to Shurtleff
and Andrews, expecting to be paid in turn by the Defendant
according to the clear terms of the lease agreement.

(Tr.

35-36)
The Defendant was free to, and did at trial, raise
every conceivable defense, including breach of all warranties.
Defendant was not foreclosed from raising the issues of the
value of the services performed and whether the repairs
were accomplished in a workmanlike manner.

In fact, Defendant

spent much of the time eliciting evidence in support of
those defenses.
Under the circumstances of this case it is clear that
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the purpose of the Rule has been satisfied.

Defendant has

not claimed that the failure to join Shurtleff and Andrews
deprived it of some important defense.

Nor has it been

shown that Shurtleff and Andrews would or could raise some
action against Defendant since the orders for service came
from Plaintiffs and were for Plaintiffs' backhoe.
E.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED.

Defendant's claim that the enforcement of the judgment
will result in unjust enrichment of the Plaintiffs' almost
requires no response.

Plaintiffs' action was for the

recovery of unpaid rental payments for the use of the
backhoe during the lease term and repairs to the backhoe
occasioned by the Defendant's use of the backhoe.

Plaintiffs

are not asking for double payment or for any recovery not
specifically provided for in the lease agreement.
l].

[Ex. P-

Plaintiffs simply seek to be reimbursed for the use and

repair of the backhoe and nothing else.
In order to support a claim of unjust enrichment, the
Defendant must show that the Plaintiffs have received a
benefit which does not belong to them.

In Baugh v. Darley,

112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 337 (1947), this Court ruled
that:
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he
has and retains money or benfits which in
justice and equity belong to another.
(Emphasis added)
The clear application of this rule of law is that the
Plaintiffs cannot be unjustly enriched for simply receiving
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the benefit of their bargain under the lease.

Plaintiffs

leased a backhoe to Defendant in return for Defendant's
promise that Plaintiffs would be paid for each day of
Defendant's use.

[Ex. P-1].

The jury awarded to Plaintiffs

the unpaid lease payments which Defendant agreed to pay for
the use of the backhoe, nothing more and nothing less.
In like manner, Plaintiffs asked only to be reimbursed
for the cost of repairs to maintain the backhoe pursuant to
the lease.

Contrary to the position of Defendant, the jury

found from the evidence that Defendant was obligated to
repair the backhoe and that the charges for such repairs
were reasonable.
Defendant's argument that the lease payment included a
reserve for repairs is simply not supported by the evidence.
The testimony of Mr. Carson was to the effect that he used
certain standard publications in assisting him to set a
lease rate.

(Tr. 7-8).

The undisputed evidence as presented

at trial is that had the lease rate included a reserve for
repairs, the lease payment would have been substantially
higher than the amount which the Defendant was required to
pay.

(Tr. 83-84).

In fact, the testimony of Mr. Carson

was that the Plaintiffs did not offer a lease which included
a reserve for repairs and that during the negotiations with
the Defendant, Mr. Tuft was told that he would be responsible
for the maintenance and repairs on the backhoe.
13).

(Tr. 12-

Accordingly, there was never any direct evidence that

the lease in question [Ex. P-1] contained a specific reserve,
in a specified, indentifiable amount, for repairs during
the
lease
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The argument of Defendant is clearly without merit and
in error.

Plaintiffs have only been made whole by the jury

award in this case and have received no windfall by enforcement
of the judgment.

Under these circumstances, the claim of

unjust enrichment is improper and must fail.
POINT II
RAY BALDWIN'S EXPERT OPINION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.
Defendant argues in Point II of its Brief that the trial
court erred in permitting Ray Baldwin to give his expert
opinion that the backhoe had not been properly maintained.
Defendant does not dispute Mr. Baldwin's qualifications
as an expert, Defendant merely asserts that the foundation for
his opinion was inadequate because he had never observed nor
did he have personal knowledge of any specific acts by Defendant
which would constitute improper maintenance.

Obviously, if

Mr. Baldwin had actually observed or had personal knowledge of
improper maintenance of the backhoe, it would not have been
necessary for him to give an opinion.

The purpose of allowing

expert opinion testimony is to permit an expert with special
knowledge or training to draw inferences or conclusions from
facts perceived by, known or made known to him, which the
jury, without such special knowledge or training, would not be
able to draw for themselves.

This general rule was expressed

in Gilbert v. Quinet, 369 P.2d 267, 268 (Ariz. 1962):
An expert may be allowed, in cases where
expert opinion is appropriate, to interpret
facts in evidence which the jury are not
qualified to interpret for themselves, McCormick,
Evidence § 13, p. 28 (1954).
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An argument similar to that made by Defendant was
asserted and rejected in Boehler v. Sanders, 404 P.2d 885,
887 (Mont. 1968):
According to appellant's argument and
the cases cited alleging support of his
theory, a policy officer, who qualifies as
an expert in traffic matters, cannot give
opinion testimony based on his investigation
if he did not witness the accident. Such is
not the law for he can give an opinion based
on the facts he testified to • . • • Appellant's
objection to this testimony was "that it
called for a conclusion and that no proper
foundation was laid." This objection was
properly overruled by the trial judge,
Admittedly, the expert witness must testify as to the
facts upon which his opinion is based (Day v. Lorenzo Smith

& Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 221 (1965) ); however,
Mr. Baldwin did testify extensively as to the facts upon
which his opinion was based.

Mr. Baldwin testified that he

had performed the final servicing on the backhoe immediately
prior to the lease to Defendant (Tr. 282) and that during
the term of that lease, he inspected and repaired the
backhoe on numerous occasions.
300-310, 313-315, 317-321).

(Tr. 282, 286-292, 293-298,

Mr. Baldwin further testified

that during the course of repairs performed at the Alpine
project, he removed the main hydraulic filter and found
that it was totally contaminated.

(Tr. 317).

After approximately forty (40) pages of testimony,
including that testimony cited above, Mr. Baldwin was
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asked, based on his inspection and the work he performed on
the machine, to give his judgment as to whether the machine
had been maintained in a proper condition.
stated that " • . •

(Tr. 321) .•

He

[i]n my opinion, when I pulled that

filter out, there was no way the machine was maintained
properly."

(Tr. 323).

The admissibility of expert testimony such as Mr.
Baldwin's is generally left to the discretion of the trial
court and this court has so held.

Batt v. State, 28 Utah

2d 417, 503 P.2d 855, 858 (1972).
The admissibility of such testimony is
primarily for the trial court to determine.
He is allowed considerable latitude of
discretion; and this court will not reverse
in the absence of clear showing of abuse; but
will leave the challenge to its reliability
as going not to its competency, but as to its
weight and credibility, which is for the jury
to determine.
After reviewing the foundation for Mr. Baldwin's
opinion, there can be no question that the trial court did
not err or abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony.
Even assuming that it was error to admit this testimony, it
does not rise to the level of a prejudicial error which
would warrant reversal.
Defendant contends that this alleged error was prejudicial
because ".

[n]o other witness testified the backhoe was

maintained improperly and there is no other testimony in
the record in the form of expert opinion directly supporting
a jury finding there was operator abuse or improper maintenance
of the machine insofar as the hydraulic system was concerned.•
(Appellant's Brief at 36-37).
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This contention ignores the testimony of Mr. Weinke
that " • . • (i]f the filters would have been changed on
time and kept clean, you wouldn't have got those metal
filings in the filters."

(Tr. 415).

Defendant's own

witness, Mr. Babcock, testified that the replacement of
filters is the responsibility of the contractor or lessee.
(Tr. 663).

Mr. Weinke also testified that hydraulic oil

added to the backhoe should " • • . pass . . • through a ten
micron filter before it goes into the machine."

(Tr. 400).

Defendant's employees admit that this was not done.

(Tr.

530).

Under similar circumstances, this Court held in
Christianson v. Debry, 23 Utah 2d 334, 463 P.2d 5 (1969),
that even if the trial court erred in admitting certain
expert opinion testimony, where there was other evidence to
support the verdict, the admission was harmless error.
POINT III
EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT REQUIRED IN DETERMINING
MERCHANTABILITY AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN FINDING
HAROLD BABCOCK UNQUALIFIED.
In Point III of its brief, the Defendant argues that
the question of the merchantable condition of the backhoe
"must come from expert witnesses • . • " and that the
exclusion of Harold Babcock's opinion as to the merchantability of the backhoe "was prejudicial since it left
defendants [sic] without the required testimony on this
critical issue •

•

(Appellant's Brief at 38 and 41)

(Emphasis added).
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Plaintiff does not dispute that expert opinion evidence
~ssue

on the

of merchantability may be considered by the

jury provided that the witness is properly qualified and
testifies as to matters within his realm of special knowledge
and that the trial judge determines that such opinion
evidence will assist the jury.

Christopher v. Larson Ford

Sales, 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976); Hooper v. General Motors
Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549 (1953).

However, the

Defendant argues that such evidence is reguired and must
be introduced to discharge its burden of proving a product
defect.

Contrary to the Defendant's assertion, the courts

have consistently held that expert testimony is not required.
In Lucas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 458 F.2d 495, 497
(1972), the Fifth Circuit Stated:
"There is no burden on plaintiff to prove a
specific defect by an expert witness as
distinguished from other proof. The fact of
a malfunction and also of a defect may be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence."
In Burrus v. Itek Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 350, 360
N.E.2d 1168 (1977), the Illinois court in construing § 2314 of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code, which is
identical to § 70A-2-314 of the Utah statute, rejected the
argument that expert testimony is required:
The defendant, while citing no
authority, nevertheless argues strongly
that specific defects • • • must be
proven by expert testimony. With this
contention we disagree for no mention of
specific defects is found in the test of
a breach of implied warranty of merchantability in our Commercial Code.
The large number of cases in which non-expert, nonopinion, direct and circumstantial evidence has been admitted
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to demonstrate unmerchantability clearly show that there is
no requirement to introduce expert opinion testimony.
~,

See,

Guardian Ins. Co. v. Anacostia Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,

320 A.2d 315 (D.C. App. 1974); Codling v. Paglia, 38 App.
Div. 2d 154, 327 N.Y.S. 2d 978 (1972); Colorado Serum Co.
v. Arp, 504 P.2d 801 (Wyo. 1972); 31 Am. Jur. 2d "Expert
and Opinion Evidence" §19.
In this case, the trial court sustained an objection
to the question seeking Mr. Babcock's opinion as to the
merchantability of the backhoe on the grounds of lack of
proper qualification.

Judge Sawaya stated, "I think

that's [referring to merchantability]
gentleman is not qualified to answer."
added).

something that this
(Tr. 670).

(Emphasis

The requisite test of proper testimony by an

expert witness is outlined in Rule 56(2) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence which states:
If the witness is testifying as an
expert, testimony of the witness in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited
to such opinions as the judge finds are
(a) based on facts or data perceived by or
personally known or made known to the
witness at the hearing and (b) within the
scope of the special knowledge, skill,
experience or training possessed by the
witness.
The Defendant argues that Mr. Babcock's training as an
engineer and his experience as a general contractor who
purchased parts qualifies him as an expert as to merchantability.

In order to conclude that the backhoe was unmerchantable,

Mr. Babcock would have to find that the mechanical problems
experienced by the backhoe were caused by defects existing in
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the backhoe at the time the lease commenced, rather than by
some intervening cause such as operator abuse.

The record

contains not one item of evidence that Mr. Babcock had any
special knowledge, skill, experience or training as a mechanic
which would enable him to reach a conclusion as to the cause
of the problems.

Defendant, in effect, is putting the cart

before the horse by arguing that a user or lessee of machinery
is an expert in such areas as design, and the local standard
of merchantability.

One could just as easily argue that a

patient who had been treated with x-rays is competent to
testify as an expert as to the local medical standard of xray treatment.
In discussing the questions of the qualifications of
expert witnesses and the admissibility of their testimony,
this Court has held that "(i]nherent in the position of the
trial judge in the immediate control of the trial is the
responsibility of passing upon whether the subject justifies
expert testimony and the qualifications of the witness as to
whether he can give sound and reliable help to the jury on
it."

Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 2d 275,

342 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1959).

And, in passing on the standard

of review, the Court stated, "The practical exigencies of the
situation make it necessary that the trial court be allowed
considerable latitude of discretion in making such determinations.

His rulings in that regard should not be disturbed

lightly, nor at all unless it clearly appears that he was in
error in his judgment on the matter."

Id.

This Court has

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-37-

consistently held that the trial judge must be accorded wide
discretion in determining the qualifications of experts and
the admissibility of their testimony.
City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d

See, e.g., Fillmore

1316, 1319 (Utah 1977); Lamb v.

Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-608 (Utah 1974).

The rule is

supported by the sound policy that the trial judge who has the
opportunity to observe the witness firsthand is in the best
position to judge his expertise and the value of his testimony.
As the rule has been stated in 31 Am. Jur. 2d "Expert & Opinion
Evidence" §31:
The trial court has the primary function
to determine whether or not a witness is an
expert or has sufficient knowledge to qualify
as an expert. The determination of the
competency and qualifications of a witness
offered as an expert is addressed to the
judicial discretion of the trial judge
before whom the testimony is offered, and
his ruling or determination in this respect
with regard to the proposed expert witness
will not be disturbed by a reviewing court,
unless that discretion has been abused, or
the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law, in which case the judgment of the trial court may be reversed.
In the instant case, the trial court had the opportunity
to observe and question the expert and to hear the testimony
regarding his qualifications firsthand.

The court did not

abuse his discretion because Mr. Babcock had not operated the
backhoe, was not a mechanic, had never repaired the backhoe,
did not inspect the backhoe while in the possession of the
Defendant, was not a lessor of backhoes and did not receive a
definition of "merchantability" upon which an opinion could be
based.

(Tr. 700-702).
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It is fundamental that the competence of an expert must
be relative to the topic about which he is asked to testify.
See, e.g., Ziegler v. Crofoot, 516 P.2d 954,

(Kan. 1973);

Hodo v. Lox, 437 P.2d 249 (Okl. 1967); 31 Am. Jur. 2d S27,
"Expert and Opinion Evidence" at 527.

The trial judge in his

discretion simply determined that Mr. Babcock did not possess
the requisite knowledge and skill relating to the matter upon
which he sought to testify.
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Mr. Babcock
had the necessary expertise, the Defendant must also show that
the failure to receive his opinion into evidence resulted in
prejudicial error.

It is submitted that the question as to

his opinion on merchantability was only one question in the
course of a 9-day trial where the jury heard exhaustive evidence
as to the question of merchantability and was necessarily
aware of the Defendant's position.

It is beyond credibility

that the jury which heard and considered that evidence would
change its position based upon Mr. Babcock's response to the
objectionable question.
POINT IV
THE EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT D-44 WHICH WAS MERELY A
CUMULATIVE SUMMARY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
In Point IV of its Brief, the Defendant argues that the
trial judge committed prejudicial error in excluding Exhibit
D-44 which was a summary prepared by Mrs. Tuft of the problems
with the backhoe based upon Defendants' reports, invoices,
telephone memoranda and the diary of Mr. Tuft.
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It is fundamental that a party seeking to rely upon
evidence must offer that evidence to the Court, which will
then rcile upon its admissibility.

Here, the Defendant attempt~

to offer Exhibit D-44 into evidence, but were met with objections as to proper foundation and hearsay.

(Tr. 745-746).

Contrary to the Defendant's assertion, the record is devoid of
any evidence that a ruling was obtained on the admissibility
of this Exhibit.

Rather than rule on the Exhibit when it was

first offered, the court instructed the Defendant to "
offer it again in the morning and I'll rule on it."
747).

(Tr.

There is no indication in the record that the Defendant

offered it again.

If Defendant had obtained a ruling in

chambers to which the Defendant took exception, the Defendant
should have preserved the record on this point.
Even assuming arguendo that Exhibit D-44 was, in fact,
offered and refused, the trial court's refusal to admit the
Exhibit was proper.

Plaintiffs fail to see the applicability

of Rule 67 cited in Appellant's Brief at 44 which concerns
ancient documents.

It appears that in order for Exhibit D-44

to be admissible, it must qualify as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Rule 65(13) and as a proper summary with
the meaning of Rule 70(l)(f).
Rule 63(13) provides:
(13) Business Entries and the Like.
Writings offered as memoranda or records
of acts, conditions or events to prove the
facts stated therein, if t~c judge finds
that they were made in tne regular course
of a business at or about the time of the
act, condition or event recorded, - j that
the sources of information from whici, made
and the method and circumstances of their
preparation were such as to indicate their
trustworthiness.
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It is by no means clear that the sources from which
Exhibit D-44 was prepared or "the method and circumstances
of [its] preparation were such as to indicate their
trustworthiness."

To take but one example, portions of

Exhibit D-44 were based upon Mr. Tuft's diaries.

The

trustworthiness of his diaries prepared only sporadically
as he periodically visited various job sites was highly
suspect and offered no assistance as to the cause of
problems with the backhoe.

In Buckley v. Altheimer, 152

F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1945), the Seventh Circuit held that
private diaries were inadmissible as a business record
exception to the hearsay rule.
Even if Exhibit D-44 was properly admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 63(13) and also
had a proper foundation under Rule 70(l)(f), which the
Plaintiffs deny, the Defendant must nevertheless show
that its "exclusion" was prejudicial error.

In Gull

Laboratories, Inc. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 589 P.2d 756,
759 (Utah 1978), this Court stated the following test of
prejudicial error:
Generally a jury verdict will only be upset
where the error committed was so substantial
and prejudicial that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been
different in the absence of such error. Id.
In the instant case, no such reasonable likelihood of a
different result exists.

Defendant offered Exhibit D-44 for

the purpose of establishing that the backhoe had problems.
Defendant admits in its Brief that Mrs. Tuft was permitted to
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testify as to those problems and even used Exhibit D-44 to
refresh·her memory.

(Appellant's Brief at 44).

Thus, at

best, Exhibit D-44 was an unnecessary, cumulative summary of
evidence which was received and considered by the jury.

As

such, the Exhibit was clearly excludable in the sound discretion of the trial court under Rule 45 as being merely cumulative and necessitating undue consumption of time.
POINT V
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 25 AND 29 ARE CORRECT
STATEMENTS OF THE LAW.
The Defendant contends that the Trial Judge committed
prejucidial error in giving the following instructions:
Instruction No. 25
In order for the Defendant to recover
under a warranty of merchantability, the
Defendant must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence the following:
1. That the Plaintiff leased a backhoe
to the Defendant which was not merchantable
at the time of the lease; and
2.

That the Defendant incurred damages;

and
3. That such damages were caused
proximately and in fact by the defective
nature of the backhoe; and

4. That the Defendant notified Plaintiff
of any breach of the warranty of merchantability
within a reasonable time after the Defendant
discovered or should have discovered any
breach.
[R. 368)
Instruction No. 29
In this case the burden of proof with
respect to the applicability of the implied
warranty of merchantability rests upon the
Defendant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the backhoe was in a defective
condition at the time the lease commenced on
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March 21, 1977 and that there was no change
in the mechanical condition of the backhoe
from the time the lease commenced until such
time as the backhoe experienced the mechanical
difficulties in question. In the absence of
proof of a defect in the backhoe on March
21, 1977, the Plaintiff may not be held
liable on a theory of implied warranty.
[R.
372]
Defendant contends that these Instructions, which state
in relevant part that the Defendant must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the backhoe was not merchantable or was
defective at the time the lease commenced, are an inaccurate
statement of the law and they are in direct conflict with the
last sentence of Instruction No. 27, requested by Defendant,
which states that the " . • . implied warranty of merchantability
attaches to the backhoe for each separate monthly term during
which time the Equipment Lease Agreement was in effect."

(R.

370)
Plaintiffs concede that there may be some inconsistency
between Instruction Nos. 25 and 29 and Instruction No. 27,
which Instruction seems to imply that each month is a separate
lease term for which a new and distinct warranty of merchantability arises.

The Plaintiffs can find no authority or

justification for the Defendant's "separate lease term"
theory.

On the contrary, the case law and commentators

uniformly support the position that the warranty of merchantability relates to the time of the sale, which in this case
would be analogous to the date the lease commenced.
White and Summers, well-recognized authorities on the
Uniform Commercial Code, state in their treatise on the
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subject, that a party seeking to recover on a warranty theory
" •••

~ust

prove that the goods did not comply with the

warranty, that is, that they were defective at the time of
the sale • •

[and) that his injury was caused,

'proximately'

and in fact, by the defective nature of the goods • • . "
White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (1972) at 272.
Courts which have addressed this issue have consistently
held that there can be no recovery under an implied warranty
of merchantability unless it can be established that the
injury complained of was caused by some defect in existence
at the time of the sale or lease and not by some act or cause
arising after delivery.
For example, in Lucchesi v. H. C. Bohack Co. Inc., 8 UCC
Reporting Service 326, 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) it was held:
To be entitled to recover damages for a
breach of that warranty [of merchantability]
by reason of a defect in a product, the
plaintiff must sustain the burden of
affirmatively establishing that "the
instrumentality causing injury was 'in a
defective condition on the date it was delivered'"
[Citations omitted], i.e., that there was
no change in its condition from the time of
its purchase until the time of the accident.
(Emphasis added)
Similarly in Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 8 UCC
Reporting Service 992 (5th Cir. 1971) it was held:
In the absence of proof of a defect in an
article on the date of delivery, the manufacturer
thereof may not be held liable on the theory
of implied warranty, United States Rubber Co.
v. Bauer, supra.
[I]n view of his ultimate concession
that the extra tolerance was probably due to
wear, we are inescapably driven to the unavoidable
conclusion that as to the engines the evidence
for the plaintiff simply failed to raise an
issue for submission to a jury on the question
of implied liability.
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Two particularly relevant cases are Kriedler v. Pontiac
Division of General Motors Corp., 15 UCC Reporting Service
798 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) and Falcon Equipment Corp. v.
Courtesy Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 19 UCC Reporting service
(8th Cir. 1976).
In Kriedler the Court held:
In the absence of proof that the implied
warranty is of a continuing nature, such as for
a fixed period of time, such warranty relates
to the time of sale and does not cover future
defects not in existence at such time or
inherent in the article sold.
[Citations
omitted]
The evidence, given the construction most
favorable to Kriedler's case, is not sufficient
to negate the possibility of an intermediate
act or agency (that is, an act or cause arising
after delivery and before the engine fire),
producing the engine failure. Neither is the
evidence sufficient to negate access to and
possible misrepair or maltreatment of the
engine by others. 19 UCC Reporting Service at
483.
The holding in Falcon is similar:
The record also fails to show a breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability or
a breach of the express warranty since there
is not sufficient evidence that any problems
with the car were the result of defective
conditions existing at the time of its sale
or delivery.
[Citations omitted]
In fact,
much of the repair history of the Mark IV
could conceivably be viewed as mere maintenance
resulting from the use of a car which had
been driven approximately 33,000 miles at the
time of trial. 15 UCC Reporting Service
at 799.
Defendant concedes that many of the mechanical problems
experienced by the backhoe ".

could be attributable to

ordinary wear and tear on the machine" (Brief of Appellant, p •
46), or were "

• caused by mechanics• (Brief of Appellant,
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p. 47).

Therefore, as Defendant concedes on page 47 of its

Brief, it is "
the evidence

an impossible burden under the state of
" for Defendant to establish that the

mechanical problems Defendant asserts constitute a breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability stem from some defect
or lack of merchantability existing at the outset of the lease
rather than from some act or cause arising after delivery.

In

making this admission, Defendant concedes that it has not
established a breach of the implied warranty of

merchantabili~.

It is not Instruction Nos. 25 and 29 which are inaccurate
statements of the law; it is Instruction No. 27, requested
by the Defendant, which is an inaccurate statement of the law.
Plaintiffs objected to that sentence in Instruction No. 27
which states that the implied warranty of merchantability
attaches to the backhoe for each separate monthly term on the
grounds that " . . • the backhoe was either merchantable or not
at the time the same was leased and the term of the lease in
this case is for an indefinite period of time after a minimum
of thirty days."

(Tr. 977).

The lease agreement [Ex. P-1] states that " • • •

[t]he

term of this lease shall be a minimum of 30 days beginning on
March 21, 1977 and for such additional days as lessee may
require such equipment."

There is only one lease and only one

warranty of merchantability.

There is simply no basis in the

law or in the evidence for Defendant's argument that each
month of the lease constitutes a separate lease term which
gives rise to a separate and new warranty of merchantability.
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Under the test for reversible error with respect to
instructions as enunciated by this and other courts, there
must be some prejudice to the complaining party.

In

Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d
1209 (1971); Wilkerson Motor Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 589
P.2d 505 (Okla. 1978); and Nelson v. Mueller, 533 P.2d 383
(Wash. 1975).

Because the erroneous Instruction No. 27

was more favorable to the Defendant than the correct rule
of law as set forth in Instruction Nos. 25 and 29, any
prejudice caused thereby was in the Defendant's favor and
thus provides no grounds for reversal.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED NO ERROR
BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 20.
Defendant contends that the Judge committed prejudicial
error by giving Instruction No. 20, which reads as follows:
Where it is difficult to determine whether a
particular act merely sheds light on the
meaning of the agreement or represents a
waiver of a term of the agreement, the
preference is in favor of waiver. Thus even
if you find that the plaintiff on occasion
did not charge the defendant for certain
repairs or gave the defendant credit for
downtime, the preferred interpretation of
such action is that the plaintiff waived its
claim against the defendant for those repairs
and downtime not charged for rather than
the interpretation that such action constitutes
a course of performance which indicates an
intent not to charge the defendant for any
downtime or for any repairs.
[R. 363]
Defendant argues two points in support of its contention
of error; first, that it is, in effect, a directed verdict on
the issue of waiver and, second, that it is an inaccurate
statement of the law.

Neither of Defendant's points is correct.
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The first sentence, and the substance of Instruction No.
20, is a direct quote from Official Comment No. 3 to Section
70A-2-208 of Article II of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code,
which the trial court found applicable to the present lease
transaction.

(Appellant's Brief at 38-9).

The second sentence

merely applies that rule of interpretation to the facts of the
present case.
Despite the assertion of the Defendant in its Brief that
the court instructed the jury that they "must find a waiver"
(Appellant's Brief at 50), it is clear from reading the instruction that it merely sets forth a rule of interpretation, and
in no way constitutes a directed verdict on the issue of

waiv~.

CONCLUSION
The lease agreement in this case was fairly negotiated
between the parties and is clear as to its terms and conditions.
The backhoe was selected by the Defendant and the Defendant
was fully aware of the machine's capabilities, having leased
this same backhoe twice previously.

The backhoe was inspected

by the Defendant prior to delivery.

Following certain repairs

at the first construction site, the Defendant elected to
continue the use of the backhoe for approximately ten (10)
months.

While the backhoe required repairs during the term of

the lease, the evidence is clear and the jury found that the
responsibility for the payment of such repairs was the Defenda~'s
The evidence was not only substantial, but in some instances
overwhelming and unrebutted that the repairs were necessitated
by reason of lack of proper maintenance by the Defendant and
negligence and abuse in the operation of the backhoe by the
Defendant.
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The lease agreement provides that following the expiration of. the minimum term of thirty (30) days either party may
terminate the Agreement upon five (5) days' written notice.
The Defendant never exercised its right of termination at any
time.

Rather, the Defendant chose to use the machine from

October, 1977 until January 20, 1978 without making any lease
payments whatsoever and failed and refused to pay for repairs.
Why the Defendant did not terminate the lease if the problems
with the backhoe were as extensive as the Defendant urged at
trial and now urges before this Court is a mystery yet unsolved.
This Court has repeatedly announced the rule that a jury
verdict will not be disturbed in the absence of substantial
prejudice.

A necessary corollary to that rule is that there

must be some solidarity in the jury verdict and that if it can
be easily set aside, the right to trial by jury is weakened.
The Defendant, by its appeal, claims this Court should now
undertake a complete review of the evidence received and heard
by the jury over a nine (9) day trial.

The Defendant, in

essence, seeks to have this Court substitute its judgment for
that of the jury and the trial judge who denied Defendant's
post-trial motions.

Such violates the rule of appellate

review as enunciated and followed by this Court.

No argument

can reasonably be made which would result in a conclusion
other than that the Defendant received a fair and impartial
trial, the jury considered, sorted and weighed all of the
evidence presented and that the Defendant has in no way suffered
any prejudice.
Based upon the foregoing, the Plaintiffs submit that the
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Judgment on Verdict of Jury and the Order of the trial court
denying:the Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment or in the
Alternative for a New Trial be sustained and affirmed and that
the Plaintiffs be awarded their costs on appeal.
DATED this

;jIJ;. day of May, 198 0.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Attorneys for'Plaintiffs and
Respondents
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
(801) 363-3300
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that two copies of the above and
foregoing Respondents' Brief was served upon the Defendant
herein by hand delivering a copy thereof to its attorney
James A. Mcintosh, 36 South State Street, Suite 800, Salt
Lake City, Utah this

.{:if!_

day of May, 1980.
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